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THE SINGLE SUPERVISION MECHANISM AND CONTAGION BETWEEN BANK AND 
SOVEREIGN RISK 
 
Abstract 
The objective of this article is to analyse how the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), the first pillar of 
the European Banking Union, affects contagion between bank and sovereign risk in the eurozone. 
Additionally, we test whether this contagion is transmitted from banks to sovereigns or vice versa, and how 
this transmission differs before and after the SSM. On the one hand, using quarterly data from 80 banks 
and 13 eurozone countries over the period 2009–2016 (2,441 observations), we do not find solid evidence 
that the SSM reduces contagion from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns. On the other hand, the analysis 
of credit default swap (CDS) spreads comprises quarterly data from 25 banks and 10 eurozone countries 
between 2009 and 2016 (771 observations). We find that the announcement of the SSM in March 2013 
reduces contagion between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. Additionally, before the announcement of the 
SSM, an increase in sovereign risk does not alter contagion. However, after this announcement, an increase 
in sovereign risk leads to lower contagion. Therefore, the announcement of the SSM has an immediate 
effect on CDS spreads, while there is not enough evidence for banks’ stock returns. 
Keywords: Single Supervision Mechanism, Bank risk, Sovereign risk, Contagion. 
JEL Classification: G01; G21; G28; H63.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, there has been a greater concern about sovereign and 
bank risk and the interdependencies between them. On the one hand, the weak capital and liquidity positions 
of the banking system, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, forced governments 
to rescue systemic banks. This raised national deficits to alarming levels, and hence the credit risk of the 
banking sector was transmitted to sovereigns (Alter and Schüler 2012; De Bruyckere et al. 2013). This 
situation was further aggravated, as the economic recession caused by the banking crisis forced 
governments to issue even more debt to stimulate economic activity (Barth et al. 2012). On the other hand, 
the financial crisis caused a sharp deterioration in the public finances of many European countries, raising 
investor concerns about sovereign risk. Greater sovereign risk was rapidly transmitted to the financial 
situation of the domestic banking sector, making it more risky and restricting its access to funding (Arezki 
et al. 2011; Correa et al. 2012; Cantero-Saiz et al. 2014). All of these facts heightened the 
interconnectedness between bank and sovereign risk, especially in peripheral countries, raising serious 
concerns about the stability of the global financial system. 
In order to break this strong link between bank and sovereign risk, several initiatives were launched. 
The most ambitious was the proposal of the Banking Union by the European Commission in 2012, which 
consists of three pillars: the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) and the common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS). Among these pillars, the SSM was the first to 
become operational on 4 November 2014, when the European Central Bank (ECB) assumed responsibility 
for European banking supervision in collaboration with the National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs) of 
each country (European Commission 2012).  
The SSM focuses on reducing contagion between banks and sovereigns, since its common regulatory 
framework will produce more homogeneous financial conditions across European banks, thereby making 
them less dependent on their home country’s sovereign risk (Nowotny 2014). In addition, these common 
rules are also intended to enhance the robustness of the eurozone banking system and to provide financial 
assistance to banks if necessary, which will reduce risk spillovers from banks to sovereigns (Leblond 2014). 
However, the SSM also poses several issues, such as potential conflicting objectives between the ECB and 
the NSA, difficulties dealing with European countries that have not joined the SSM, conflicting 
relationships between micro- and macro-prudential supervision, or uncertainties about the ECB’s ability to 
stabilize the banking system, since its main task is to ensure price stability (Angeloni 2015; Barba-Navaretti 
et al. 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2015). 
Despite the important repercussions that the SSM has on contagion between bank and sovereign 
risk, very little research has been done on this issue. On the one hand, the literature on contagion between 
bank and sovereign risk in Europe is relatively recent, since this was not a major concern until the current 
crisis (see, for example, Bolton and Jeanne 2011; Li and Zinna 2014; Bocola 2016; Altavilla et al. 2016; 
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Buch et al. 2016). Some studies focus on the determinants of either bank or sovereign risk in isolation 
(Longstaff et al. 2011; Aizenman et al. 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2013; Gündüz and Kaya 2014). 
Other researchers focus on mutual contagion effects between sovereign and bank risk (Alter and Schüler 
2012; De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Alter and Beyer 2014; Yu 2017). On the other hand, a few papers centre 
on the SSM, either from the perspective of its advantages and issues or that of its influence on the stock 
market, but do not quantify its effects on the stability of the financial system (Darvas and Wolff 2013; 
Leblond 2014; Barba-Navaretti et al. 2015; Howarth and Quaglia 2015; Carboni et al. 2017). Thus, to the 
best of our knowledge, there are no studies that analyse the effects of the SSM on contagion between bank 
and sovereign risk. 
In this regard, this article provides two contributions to the existing literature. Firstly, we analyse 
how the adoption of the SSM affects contagion between bank and sovereign risk in the eurozone. Secondly, 
we are interested in determining whether this contagion is transmitted from banks to sovereigns or vice 
versa, and how this transmission differs before and after the SSM. So, we carry out two additional tests. On 
the one hand, we analyse how an increase in bank risk affects contagion both before and after the SSM, and 
on the other, we study how the impact of an increase in sovereign risk on this contagion varies before and 
after the SSM. 
Our analysis is performed through two indicators: banks’ stock returns and CDS spreads. On the one 
hand, the analysis of stock returns comprises quarterly data from 80 banks and 13 eurozone countries 
between 2009 and 2016 (2,441 observations). We do not obtain solid evidence that the SSM reduces 
contagion from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns. On the other hand, the analysis of CDS spreads is 
based on quarterly data from 25 banks and 10 eurozone countries over the period 2009–2016 (771 
observations). We find that the announcement of the SSM in March 2013 reduces contagion between bank 
and sovereign CDS spreads. Additionally, before the announcement of the SSM, an increase in sovereign 
risk does not modify the degree of contagion, while after the announcement, an increase in sovereign risk 
leads to lower contagion, probably because after the announcement of the SSM, bank risk does not lead to 
an increase in sovereign risk, thereby reducing contagion between the two types of risk. The results of this 
article would suggest that CDS spreads respond immediately to the announcement of the SSM, while there 
is not consistent evidence for banks’ stock prices. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the previous literature; Section 
3 focuses on empirical analysis and discussion of the results; and Section 4 presents the conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Contagion between bank and sovereign risk 
There are several mechanisms that explain the interconnectedness between bank and sovereign risk. 
On the one hand, greater sovereign risk can be transmitted to bank risk through several channels: asset 
holdings, collateral and government guarantees channels (CGFS 2011).  
First, the asset holdings channel proposes that higher sovereign risk leads to losses in banks’ 
government debt holdings, which impacts negatively on their balance sheets and makes them more of a risk 
(Correa et al. 2014).2 This mechanism is especially relevant in Europe, where banks are greatly exposed to 
their home country’s debt (Breton et al. 2012). In addition, European banks are also exposed to non-
domestic sovereign debt, thus the sustainability of public debt in stressed countries hinders the health of 
other eurozone countries’ banking sectors (Bolton and Jeanne 2011; Li and Zinna 2014). In this regard, 
Angeloni and Wolff (2012) showed that banks’ exposure to peripheral countries’ debt reduces their stock 
market values. Popov and van Horen (2013) reported that European banks with higher exposure to foreign 
sovereign debt were more negatively affected during the sovereign debt crisis and reduced lending to a 
greater extent. Gennaioli et al. (2014), using a sample of both developed and emerging economies, found 
that the adverse effects of government defaults on credit supply are greater in countries where banks hold 
more government bonds. Similarly, Altavilla et al. (2016) revealed that banks’ exposure to domestic debt 
in the eurozone stressed countries amplifies sovereign risk transmission on lending. On the other hand, 
Bocola (2016) and Buch et al. (2016) found that holdings of risky government bonds increase bank risk in 
Italy and Germany, respectively. 
Second, the collateral channel states that greater sovereign risk reduces the collateral of banks to 
obtain funding and hence increases banks’ risk (Davies and Ng 2011). Correa et al. (2012) showed that 
European banks were less able to obtain funding from the United States money market during the sovereign 
                                                          
2 Banks usually hold domestic government debt, which enables them to hold less regulatory capital against that debt. 
This is because government securities have always been considered risk free (Barth et al. 2012). 
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debt crisis due to collateral problems. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) reported evidence of a collateral channel 
for a sample of European banks, especially for those with poor levels of capital, a weak funding structure 
and less traditional banking activities. More recently, Engler and Steffen (2016), using a theoretical model 
calibrated to Greek data, also found support for the collateral channel. 
Third, the government guarantees channel is related to the implicit and explicit guarantees that too-
big-to-fail banks receive from their respective governments, due to the adverse effects that bankruptcy of 
such banks would have on the economy. Greater sovereign risk reduces the value of these guarantees, which 
contributes to increasing bank risk (Gray and Malone 2012). Brown and Dinc (2011), from a sample of 
emerging economies, reported that countries with higher deficit are less prone to rescue troubled banks. 
Schich and Lindh (2012) showed that the guarantees European banks obtain from governments become 
lower as the country’s creditworthiness deteriorates. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2013) found 
that, during the crisis, systemic banks experienced a reduction in their market valuation in countries with 
large fiscal deficits, as these banks became too big to save. Correa et al. (2014) showed that greater 
sovereign risk has a negative impact on bank stock returns, especially for those banks that are expected to 
receive more government guarantees. 
Apart from the previous three channels, other studies found that downgrades of sovereign rating are 
often followed by downgrades in domestic bank rating, which increases their risk. Arezki et al. (2011) 
focused on a sample of European countries over the period 2007–2010 and showed that sovereign rating 
downgrades caused an important spillover effect, both across financial markets and countries. Williams et 
al. (2013) documented that sovereign rating variations in emerging markets have a significant impact on 
bank rating. Alsakka et al. (2014) reported similar results in Europe, especially during the crisis and for the 
peripheral countries. Moreover, Caselli et al. (2014) found that sovereign rating downgrades have a 
negative effect on bank share prices in the eurozone, while rating upgrades have no influence. However, 
since sovereign risk impacts negatively on banks’ balance sheets and reduces their government guarantees, 
it is likely that the reduction in banks’ rating observed in these studies is more a consequence of the other 
three channels mentioned previously. Moreover, other studies suggested the existence of a sovereign 
ceiling, which implies that private sector ratings cannot be higher than sovereign ratings, and therefore in 
many cases this contagion effect from sovereign to bank risk could be automatic. This is because, normally, 
the private sector shows a high default dependence on its home country, as well as a low degree of insulation 
from the domestic economic and financial disruptions typically associated with sovereign distress. 
Borensztein et al. (2013) showed that the influence of a sovereign ceiling on corporate ratings is more 
pronounced in countries where there are still capital account restrictions and high political risk. More 
recently, Adelino and Ferreira (2016) found that banks with a rating equal to or above their sovereign prior 
to a downgrade are significantly more likely to be downgraded after a sovereign downgrade than banks 
rated below their sovereign.  
On the other hand, higher bank risk can also be transmitted to sovereign risk. When bank risk sharply 
increases, governments should issue implicit or explicit guarantees to rescue troubled banks, especially if 
these banks are too big to fail. This raises public debt dramatically, which has a negative impact on public 
finances and leads to higher sovereign risk (Gray et al. 2008; Kräussl et al. 2016). In addition, banking 
crises imply economic recessions that weaken public finances and push up sovereign risk (Angeloni and 
Wolff 2012).  
In this regard, Ejsing and Lemke (2011) reported that government bailouts and guarantee 
programmes for the financial sector induce a drop in bank risk but an increase in sovereign risk. Mody 
(2009) showed that the rescue of Bear Stearns in March 2008 raised spillovers from the banking to the 
sovereign sector, while Alter and Beyer (2014) obtained similar results for the nationalization of Bankia in 
Spain. Other papers revealed that government bailouts increase not only sovereign risk but also bank risk. 
For instance, Alter and Schüler (2012) showed evidence of risk contagion from banks to sovereigns, but 
only before bailout programmes are launched, while after these programmes, contagion is from sovereigns 
to banks. Similarly, Acharya et al. (2014) found that government bailouts seriously affect sovereign risk, 
which reduces the value of government guarantees that benefit the financial sector, and hence bank risk 
increases. Finally, other papers suggested that the effects of government bailouts on sovereign risk are 
determined by the size of the financial system. Gerlach et al. (2010) documented that sovereign risk 
increases with the size of the banking system in periods of crisis, especially following the implementation 
of government rescue packages. In addition, Dieckmann and Plank (2012) reported that the situation of a 
country’s financial system affects sovereign risk, and the magnitude of this impact depends on the 
importance of a country’s financial system in the pre-crisis years.  
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2.2. The Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM) 
As we mentioned previously, the financial crisis in Europe has led to greater contagion between 
bank and sovereign risk. To fight this observed contagion between banks and sovereigns, several policy 
reforms have been adopted. These reforms consider a macro-prudential approach to address systemic risk 
instead of focusing only on a micro-prudential perspective, which implies that regulation and supervision 
policies should also cover macroeconomic or sovereign aspects rather than individual financial institutions 
(Carboni et al. 2017). Examples of these macro-prudential reforms include the introduction of global 
liquidity standards, the new capital adequacy requirements under Basel III (which will enable banks to have 
more resources to protect themselves against the funding restrictions caused by sovereign risk) and the non-
conventional measures carried out by the ECB to support the financing conditions of the banking sector 
and promote financial stability.3  
One of the most ambitious macro-prudential measures to break the vicious circle between bank and 
sovereign risk has been the foundation of the European Banking Union in 2012, which is based on three 
pillars: the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the 
common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS). The first one, the SSM, became operational on 4 November 
2014 and is the first pillar to officially come into force, since it is crucial to guarantee the functioning of 
the other two pillars.4 It grants the ECB a supervisory role to monitor all banks of the eurozone plus those 
of any non-eurozone countries wishing to join, in cooperation with the National Supervision Authorities 
(NSAs) (European Commission 2012). To ensure efficient supervision, the ECB only supervises directly 
significant credit institutions,5 while the remaining banks are supervised by their NSA. Before the SSM 
became operational in late 2014, several health checks of banks’ balance sheets were performed to avoid 
damage to the SSM’s reputation, due to troubled banks in the early days of its operation, so those banks 
that failed the test had to be recapitalized or restructured. 
Several features of the SSM will contribute to reducing contagion between bank and sovereign risk 
(Leblond 2014; Nowotny 2014; Howarth and Quaglia 2015). First, this single supervision implies following 
clear and common rules, which will reduce the uncertainty premiums that some European banks pay. This 
will generate more homogeneous funding conditions for all banks, and hence the banking sector will be 
less dependent on its home country’s sovereign risk. Second, the sharper supervision that the SSM promotes 
and the stress tests carried out before its adoption will improve the health of the banking system, thereby 
reducing the probability of economic recessions that can spill over to sovereign risk. Third, the SSM enables 
the direct intervention of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ESM will provide temporary 
financial assistance to banks experiencing liquidity problems, which will mitigate credit risk transfer from 
banks to sovereigns, since governments will not need to rescue troubled banks with public debt.  
Consequently, we propose that the SSM reduces contagion between bank and sovereign risk. This 
implies that the effects of an increase in bank (sovereign) risk on this contagion will differ before and after 
the implementation of the SSM. Prior to the implementation of the SSM, an increase in bank (sovereign) 
risk produces an increase in sovereign (bank) risk, which leads to greater contagion. However, after the 
SSM, bank (sovereign) risk does not sharply react to an increase in sovereign (bank) risk, thereby reducing 
contagion between both types of risk.  
3. Empirical analyses 
The analysis of SSM effects on contagion between bank and sovereign risk is divided into two 
empirical analyses. The first empirical analysis is based on stock returns indicators and the second on credit 
                                                          
3 These ECB non-conventional measures comprise the following key elements: fixed-rate full allotment for all 
refinancing operations, liquidity injections and longer-term credit operations, extension of collateral eligibility, 
currency swap agreements or several purchase programmes, such as the Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP), 
the Asset-backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP) and the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). 
4 The second pillar, the SRM, became fully operational on 1 January 2016, and its purpose is to ensure an orderly 
resolution of failing banks through a common resolution fund financed by the banking sector. The third pillar, the 
common DGS, is a system in each eurozone country that reimburses depositors (up to a defined limit) if their bank fails 
and deposits become unavailable. Member banks pay contributions to this guarantee scheme based on their risk profiles 
and other factors. In addition, the common DGS will improve the information that depositors receive and will reduce 
the time period to reimburse depositors up to seven working days by 2024. 
5 The ECB started supervising the 126 significant banks of the participating countries, which hold almost 82% of 
banking assets in the eurozone. The ECB can decide at any time to classify a bank as significant to ensure that high 
supervisory standards are applied consistently.  
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default swap (CDS) spread series.6 With regard to the first indicator, as shown by Figure 1, banks’ stock 
prices decreased sharply in most of the eurozone countries during the first years of the financial crisis, 
especially in high sovereign risk countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal). As regards the second indicator, 
Figures 2 and 3 show that both bank and sovereign CDS spreads increased strongly when the sovereign 
debt crisis was more intense (2010–2012), mainly in Greece, Ireland and Portugal. In the particular case of 
Greece, bank and sovereign CDS spreads remained particularly high in recent years, while in the rest of the 
eurozone countries these spreads were much more contained. Figure 4 depicts the correlation between bank 
and sovereign CDS spreads in several eurozone countries between 2009 and 2016. In general, there was an 
increased correlation between both CDSs during the sovereign debt crisis, while after this correlation 
decreased. In the following sections we explain the empirical analyses and the results of each of these two 
indicators (stock returns and CDS spreads) separately. 
 [Insert Figures 1, 2, 3 & 4] 
3.1. Stock returns analysis 
3.1.1. Selection of the sample 
The purpose of this first analysis is to analyse how the SSM affects banks’ stock returns and to test 
whether contagion from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns differs before and after the SSM. We used 
quarterly data of stock returns and some other macroeconomic information for an unbalanced panel of 80 
banks from 13 eurozone countries7 between 2009 and 2016 (2,441 observations). We selected all the 
eurozone banks with available data in Datastream about stock prices during our sample period. Table 1 
shows an overview of the banks and countries that are included in this analysis. All the necessary data come 
from the Datastream database and the Fama/French – Data Library.  
 [Insert Table 1] 
3.1.2. Econometric model and data 
To analyse the effects of the SSM on contagion from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns we used 
the following model based on the study of Allegret et al. (2016). However, our model introduces the SSM 
and its interactions with sovereign risk: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑅𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑅𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑀,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝑆𝑀𝐵,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑅𝐻𝑀𝐿,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑅𝑀𝑂𝑀,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡    (1) 
 
The dependent variable, Ri,t, represents the excess return of bank stocks over the risk-free rate (Fama 
and French 1993; Allegret et al. 2016). It is calculated as the average of the total daily stock returns of bank 
i in quarter t minus the 10-year government interest rate. 
SSM is a dummy variable that represents the Single Supervision Mechanism and allows us to 
examine whether the SSM affects banks’ stock returns. As we mentioned previously, the SSM entered into 
force on 4 November 2014, so this variable takes the value of 1 from Q4-2014 to Q4-2016, and 0 otherwise. 
The effect that the SSM has on banks’ stock returns is measured by the coefficient β1, which is expected to 
be negative and significant. As Carboni et al. (2017) suggest, the introduction of the SSM penalized banks 
in the short run because investors expect different supervision of banks under the ECB’s direct control with 
respect to banks remaining with their NSA. This would suggest that investors expect a more intrusive 
approach by the ECB, or at least are worried about a possibly heterogeneous application of supervision 
rules for treated and control banks. These facts would worsen banks’ performance in the stock market. 
SR is the sovereign risk variable and is calculated as the variation in the five-year sovereign CDS 
spreads in quarter t in relation to quarter t-1 (De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Allegret et al. 2016; Yu 2017). The 
use of this variable allows us to analyse contagion effects from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns. Since 
we are also interested in analysing how these contagion effects differ before and after the adoption of the 
SSM, we also included in Equation (1) the interaction term between the SSM dummy and the sovereign risk 
variable (SSM*SR). This interaction term follows the base approach, which is the most common way of 
introducing interaction terms between a dummy variable and another independent variable into a regression 
(Yip and Tsang, 2007). 
                                                          
6 CDS contracts are bilateral swap agreements mainly transacted in over-the-counter (OTC) derivative markets and 
allow the CDS seller to provide protection for the buyer. The spreads represent the regular payments that must be paid 
by the buyer to the seller for the contingent claim in the case of a credit event. 
7 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia 
and Spain. 
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On the one hand, the coefficient β2 measures the effects of sovereign risk (SR) on stock returns 
before the SSM. We expect this coefficient to have a negative and significant sign, since before the SSM 
an increase in sovereign risk would rapidly reduce the stock returns of the domestic banks (Caselli et al. 
2014). On the other hand, the coefficient β3 captures the differential effects of sovereign risk on stock 
returns after the SSM in relation to the period before it. The SSM is supposed to reduce interdependencies 
between sovereigns and banks, so we expect the relationship between sovereign risk and stock returns to 
be significantly more positive after the SSM than before, which implies that the coefficient β3 is significant 
with a positive sign. If this was the case, to test the final effects of sovereign risk on stock returns after the 
SSM we should conduct a linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients of SR and SR*SSM (β2+ β3).  
RM,t, RSMB,t, RHML,t and RMOM,t are control variables, based on the four-factor model of Carhart (1997), 
that capture four common sources of risk across stocks. This is the general framework to control for these 
common risks because it considers the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), which accounts for 
most of the market anomalies left unexplained by the one-factor Sharpe (1964) – Lintner (1965) Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), plus the short-run persistence of returns or momentum effect evidenced by 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). These common risks are the market risk of the CAPM (RM,t), two non-
diversifiable risks (a small size risk (RSMB,t) and a distress risk (RHML,t)) and a momentum effect (RMOM,t).  
RM,t is calculated as the difference between the average of the total daily European returns and the 
10-year German government interest rate in quarter t.  
RSMB,t is the spread between the returns on small and big European stocks.  
RHML,t is the spread between the returns of high book-to-market European stocks (value stocks) and 
low ones (growth stocks).  
RMOM,t is the spread between the returns of past winners (European stocks with the highest prior 
returns) and past losers (European stocks with the lowest prior returns). 
The error term is 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; i = 1,2,…; N indicates a specific bank i; j = 1,2,…; J indicates a particular 
country j; and t = 1,2,…; T indicates a particular quarter t. 
Table 2 provides a summary of the independent variables and their expected relationship with the 
dependent variable. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Table 4 
presents the correlations between variables to identify potential collinearity problems. 
 [Insert Tables 2, 3 & 4] 
We analysed the effects of the SSM on contagion from sovereign risk to stock returns with the panel 
data methodology because it allows us to account for individual heterogeneity so that it controls for the 
unobserved differences among banks or changes over time. In addition, panel data also allow us to avoid 
the problem of possible endogeneity (Hsiao 1985). We estimated Equation (1) with panel regression 
methods.8 The use of this estimation method requires testing whether a fixed- or random-effects model is 
more suitable. To check whether the fixed-effects or the random-effects model is statistically more efficient, 
we applied the Hausman test, which tests whether the unique errors (ui) between banks are correlated with 
the explanatory variables (Xi,t) (Hausman 1978). 
3.1.3. Empirical results 
Table 5, model (a), presents the results, which show that the p-value of the Hausman test is lower 
than 0.05, so we reject the null hypothesis that the unique errors (ui) are not correlated with the explanatory 
variables (Xi,t), and therefore the fixed-effects estimator is more consistent. 
 [Insert Table 5] 
In Table 5, model (a), the variable SSM has a negative and significant coefficient, which implies that 
the entry into force of the SSM reduces banks’ stock returns. As we previously proposed, the adoption of 
the SSM penalized banks’ performance in the stock market, probably because of investors’ fear of 
regulatory inconsistencies and a potential intrusive approach by the ECB (Carboni et al. 2017). 
The variable SR, which captures the influence of sovereign risk on stock returns before the SSM, is 
negative and significant. Therefore, before the SSM an increase in sovereign risk leads to a reduction in 
stock returns. The variable SSM*SR, which measures the differential effects of sovereign risk after the SSM 
with respect to the period before it, is positive and significant. Since SSM*SR is significant, to measure the 
final effects of sovereign risk on stock returns after the SSM we must carry out a linear restriction test of 
                                                          
8 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this methodology to us. 
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the sum of the coefficients associated with SR and SSM*SR (represented in Table 5, model (a), by LR. Test. 
SSM*SR). This linear restriction test is not significant, so we have no evidence that sovereign risk affects 
stock returns after the SSM. 
In order to avoid the SSM dummy variable being confounded with other regulatory changes that 
came into play during our sample period, we performed additional analyses and replaced the SSM dummy 
in Equation (1) with other regulatory dummies to check whether other events also affect our results:  
 
-SSMANN: this considers the date when the SSM was officially announced on 19 March 2013. Thus, it 
takes the value of 1 from Q2-2013 to Q4-2016, and 0 otherwise.  
 
-DRAGHI: this accounts for the famous Mario Draghi’s speech on 26 July 2012 to authorize Outright 
Monetary Transactions (OMTs). So, it takes the value of 1 from Q3-2012 to Q4-2016, and 0 otherwise.  
 
-SRM: this considers the Single Resolution Mechanism, which was the second pillar of the European 
Banking Union that entered into force on 1 January 2016. Therefore, this dummy takes the value of 1 from 
Q1-2016 to Q4-2016, and 0 otherwise. 
 
In Table 5, model (b), we analysed the influence of the dummy SSMANN. In this regard, the variable 
SSMANN is not significant, so the announcement of the SSM does not affect banks’ stock returns.  
The variable SR, which measures the effects of sovereign risk on stock returns before the 
announcement of the SSM, is negative and significant. On the other hand, the variable SSMANN*SR, which 
represents the differential effects of sovereign risk after the announcement of the SSM with respect to the 
period before it, is not significant. So, the effects of sovereign risk on stock returns before the announcement 
of the SSM are not significantly different from those after this announcement.  
In Table 5, model (c), we replaced the SSM dummy with the DRAGHI dummy, which captures the 
Mario Draghi’s famous speech in July 2012 authorizing OMT transactions. The variable DRAGHI shows 
a positive and significant coefficient, so Draghi’s speech has a positive impact on stock returns.  
The variable SR, which captures the effects of sovereign risk on stock returns before the speech, is 
negative and significant. However, the interacted variable DRAGHI*SR is not significant, so the negative 
relationship between sovereign risk and stock returns does not significantly differ before and after Draghi’s 
speech. 
In Table 5, model (d), we replaced the SSM dummy with the SRM dummy, which measures the 
implementation of the second pillar of the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Mechanism, in 
January 2016. The variable SRM is negative and significant, thus the entry into force of the SRM reduces 
banks’ stock returns. This result is similar to the one obtained in model (a) regarding the adoption of the 
SSM, so the implementation of the European Banking Union itself impacts negatively on banks’ 
performance in the stock market. As we mentioned previously, probably, the introduction of the Banking 
Union led to uncertainties among investors about the new regulatory framework, thereby penalizing banks’ 
stock returns in the short run (Carboni et al. 2017). 
The variable SR, which reflects the effects of sovereign risk on stock returns before the SRM, is 
negative and significant. The interaction term between SRM and sovereign risk (SRM*SR) has a positive 
and significant coefficient, so the effects of sovereign risk on stock returns are significantly more positive 
after the SRM than before. Thus, we must perform a linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients 
associated with SR and SRM*SR (represented in Table 5, model (d), by LR. Test. SRM*SR). This linear 
restriction test is not significant, so we have no evidence that sovereign risk affects stock returns after the 
SRM.  
With regard to the control variables, the variables RM,t, RSMB,t and RHML,t are significant with a positive 
sign in all the models, so the market, small size and distress risk, respectively, positively affect banks’ stock 
returns.9 
In summary, these results show that the adoption of both the SSM and the SRM negatively affects 
banks’ stock returns. However, despite their negative influence on stock performance, the SSM and the 
SRM would contribute to reducing contagion from sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns. On the one hand, 
                                                          
9 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have repeated all the analyses by excluding all insignificant 
explanatory variables and the results are similar to those reported in this article. These results are not shown, but are 
available on request. 
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before the SSM and the SRM, respectively, there is a significant negative relationship between sovereign 
risk and stock returns. However, after the SSM and the SRM, respectively, there is no evidence of this 
negative relationship. On the other hand, we have no evidence that other previous regulatory measures 
reduce contagion between sovereigns and banks. In this regard, both before and after the announcement of 
the SSM and Draghi’s speech, respectively, an increase in sovereign risk leads to a decline in banks’ stock 
returns.  
3.1.4. Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of our results, we have repeated all the previous analyses by replacing each 
individual regulatory dummy (SSM, SSMANN, DRAGHI and SRM) with year dummies to control for year 
fixed effects.10 These results are shown in Table 6.  
 [Insert Table 6] 
In Table 6, model (a), the variable SR is negative and significant, so before the SSM an increase in 
sovereign risk leads to a reduction in stock returns. The variable SSM*SR is not significant, so the effects 
of sovereign risk on stock returns after the SSM are not significantly different from those before the SSM.  
In Table 6, model (b), the variable SR has a significant and negative coefficient, which implies that 
before the announcement of the SSM there is a negative relationship between sovereign risk and stock 
returns. The variable SSMANN*SR is also negative and significant, so we must perform a linear restriction 
test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SR and SSMANN*SR. This linear restriction test has also 
a negative and significant coefficient and, hence, after the announcement of the SSM, stock returns decrease 
as sovereign risk rises. 
In Table 6, model (c), SR is negative and significant, which is why sovereign risk has a negative 
impact on stock returns before Draghi’s speech. However, this impact is not significantly different after the 
speech because the variable DRAGHI*SR is not significant.  
Finally, we obtain similar results as for the variable SRM in Table 6, model (d), so the negative 
influence of SR on stock returns is not significantly different after the SRM than before the SRM. 
Looking at the results of Tables 5 and 6, we can only conclude that the SSM and the SRM themselves 
negatively affect stock returns whereas Draghi’s speech affects them positively. However, despite its 
positive influence on stock returns, Draghi’s speech does not reduce contagion effects from sovereign risk 
to banks’ stock returns. On the other hand, the announcement of the SSM does not significantly affect stock 
returns. Moreover, the relationship between sovereign risk and stock returns is negative both before and 
after the announcement of the SSM, so similar to Draghi’s speech, the announcement of the SSM does not 
reduce contagion. This would suggest that the regulatory measures adopted before the adoption of the SSM 
in November 2014 do not contribute to mitigating contagion. Probably, as the results of Table 5 suggest, 
the adoption of the SSM and the SRM would mitigate the negative relationship between sovereign risk and 
stock returns, however, this evidence is not confirmed by controlling for time dummies. Therefore, we do 
not have enough evidence that the SSM and the SRM reduce contagion11. 
3.2. CDS spreads analysis 
3.2.1. Selection of the sample 
The purpose of this second analysis is to examine how the adoption of the SSM affects contagion 
between bank and sovereign risk through CDS spreads. In addition, we test whether this contagion is 
transmitted from banks to sovereigns or vice versa, and how this transmission differs before and after the 
SSM. We selected all the eurozone banks with available data regarding CDS in Datastream. Datastream 
contains data about sovereign CDS for all the eurozone countries except for Luxembourg, but only shows 
data about bank CDS for 56 banks operating in 10 eurozone countries. Furthermore, since we use quarterly 
CDS and we need to control for several financial characteristics of banks, we can only include in the sample 
those banks that also have balance sheets available with quarterly frequency in Datastream. In this regard, 
25 out of the 56 banks mentioned previously fulfil this criterion.12 Therefore, we obtained CDS spread 
series and some other financial and macroeconomic information for an unbalanced selection of 25 banks 
                                                          
10 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
11 As regards the control variables in Table 6, only RHML,t (distress risk) is significant with a positive sign in all the 
models. 
12 De Bruyckere et al. (2013) also had a similar sample size for Eurozone banks in an analysis of contagion between 
bank and sovereign CDS spreads. 
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from 10 eurozone countries13 between 2009 and 2016 (771 observations). Table 7 shows an overview of 
the banks and countries that are included in this analysis. CDS spreads data and each bank’s financial 
information come from the Datastream database, while the home country macroeconomic data of each bank 
come from the OECD statistics, the ECB and the Bruegel database. 
 [Insert Table 7] 
3.2.2. Methodology and econometric model  
To measure bank and sovereign credit risk, we used the spreads on credit default swaps (CDSs). In 
line with other studies, we use CDS spreads on five-year senior debt contracts, since these are considered 
to be the most actively traded and the most liquid ones (Anderson 2011; Alter and Schüler 2012; Aizenman 
et al. 2013; De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Yu 2017).  
Using CDS spreads as credit risk proxies provides several advantages (Aizenman et al. 2013). First, 
they reflect timelier market perceptions of risk, while other risk measures, such as rating agencies, take 
more time before changing the rating of entities. Second, government and bond yields, which can also be 
used as credit risk variables, have the difficulty of dealing with time to maturity and include, apart from 
default risk, inflation expectations and demand/supply for credit conditions. However, CDS spreads capture 
explicitly default risk, which is the only variable in which we are interested.  
One starting point to measure contagion could be looking at simple (raw) correlations between bank 
and sovereign credit risk indicators. However, focusing on raw correlations to capture contagion can be 
biased, especially in times of crisis, since higher correlations would be expected in periods of higher 
volatility (Forbes and Rigobon 2002). To avoid this bias, contagion is defined as excess correlation, which 
is correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals or common factors 
(Bekaert et al. 2005; Pasquariello 2007). 
Following the approach of Anderson (2011) and De Bruyckere et al. (2013), to measure this excess 
correlation we first define a factor model where we decompose raw correlations into fundamental and 
excess correlations by assuming that CDS spread changes follow a linear factor structure. According to this 
assumption, the raw correlation between CDS spread changes of bank i and its home country j in period t 
can be decomposed as follows: 
𝐸[∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡∆𝐶𝐷𝑆 ?´?,𝑡] = 𝐸[(𝛽𝑖𝐹´ + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡)(𝛽𝑗𝐹´ + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡)´] = 𝛽𝑖𝐸[𝐹´𝐹]𝛽´𝑗 + 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝜀 ?´?,𝑡],    (2) 
where ΔCDS is an Nx1 vector of CDS spread changes, β is an NxK matrix of factor exposures, F is a 1xK 
vector of common factors that affect bank and sovereign CDS spreads simultaneously, and ε is an Nx1 
vector of model errors (estimated residuals). This decomposition provides two covariance matrices: 
𝛽𝑖𝐸[𝐹´𝐹]𝛽´𝑗 and 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝜀 ?´?,𝑡]. The excess correlation is computed by extracting from the correlation matrix 
the estimated residuals: 𝐸[𝜀𝑖,𝑡𝜀 ?´?,𝑡]. 
Equation (2) suggests that greater correlation between bank and sovereign credit risk may be for 
three reasons (Anderson 2011): (i) an increase in exposure of CDS spread changes to common factors; (ii) 
increased correlation between the common factors; and (iii) an increase in the correlation between 
unexplained CDS spread changes, which is considered contagion. 
Consequently, when the increase in raw correlation is completely due to common factors, the excess 
correlation will be zero. However, when bank and sovereign CDS spread changes are still correlated after 
controlling for common factors, this will be an evidence of contagion between the bank and the country 
level. In order to measure this contagion and how the SSM affects it, we follow a three-step procedure (De 
Bruyckere et al. 2013): first, we estimate the residuals of a regression on some common determinants of 
bank and sovereign CDS spreads, using daily data; next, we estimate the quarterly correlation between the 
bank and sovereign CDS residuals; finally, we regress these quarterly correlations on SSM and other 
explanatory variables. Each of these three steps is explained below. 
With regard to the first step, we control for the common factors that affect bank and sovereign CDS, 
by regressing CDS spread changes on four state variables (De Bruyckere et al. 2013): 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  (3) 
ΔCDS is the change in CDS spread for bank or country i. Market is the total stock market index for 
the European Union and is an indicator of business climate. A better business climate reduces the 
probability of default, and thus we would expect a negative sign for the Market variable in the factor model 
                                                          
13 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
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(Alter and Beyer 2014; Yu 2017). iTraxx is an index of the equally weighted average of the 125 most liquid 
CDS series in Europe. A higher iTraxx represents a higher overall default risk in the economy; therefore, 
we expect a positive sign for this variable (Berndt and Obreja 2010; Ejsing and Lemke 2011). Vstoxx is a 
volatility index and captures market expectations. A higher volatility causes greater uncertainty, so this 
variable should have a positive sign (Fontana and Scheicher 2010; Drago and Gallo 2016). Term is the 
difference between the 10-year government bond yield for each country and the one-year Euribor rate. It is 
a proxy for market expectations about future conditions in the financial market. We expect a negative 
relationship between the variable Term and CDS spreads (De Bruyckere et al. 2013).14 We regress these 
factor models for each bank and country using daily data. 
For the second step of our procedure, from each regression of CDS spread variation, we compute 
excess correlation as the correlation between the residuals (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) of a bank and those of its respective home 
country in a specific quarter.15 This excess correlation is the one that still exists after controlling for common 
factors and hence constitutes evidence of contagion between bank and sovereign risk (De Bruyckere et al. 
2013; Alter and Beyer 2014). Figures 5 and 6 show the time evolution of the quarterly averages of these 
residuals and of the correlations respectively between 2009 and 2016. Figure 5 reveals that both bank and 
sovereign residuals follow a similar trend. In general, both average residuals experience greater variations 
before the adoption of the SSM, mainly between 2009 and 2011, while after the SSM, the values of both 
residuals are closer to zero. Figure 6 shows that correlations between bank and sovereign residuals change 
constantly throughout the period, especially before the SSM. On average, these correlations range from 
0.102 to 0.367 before the SSM, whereas after the SSM they range from 0.073 to 0.233. 
[Insert Figures 5 & 6] 
 Finally, in the third step of our procedure we regress the quarterly correlations between bank and 
sovereign CDS spread residuals on SSM and other explanatory variables. This step allows us to analyse the 
effects of the SSM and CDS spread variations on contagion between bank and sovereign risk. We propose 
the following model based on the approach of De Bruyckere et al. (2013). However, our article includes 
the SSM and its interactions with sovereign and bank CDS spread variations: 
𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽2∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽4∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑡 ∗ ∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +  𝛽6𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽8𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐴𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑀𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛽11∆𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑃𝑈𝐵𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐵𝐴𝐿𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                           (4) 
The dependent variable, EXCCORRi,j,t , represents the excess correlation between the CDS spreads 
of bank i and its home country j in quarter t (De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Alter and Beyer 2014).16 It is a 
proxy for contagion between bank and sovereign credit risk and, as we mentioned previously, it is calculated 
as the correlation between the estimated residuals in the factor model regressions of Equation (3). 
SSM is a dummy variable that represents the Single Supervision Mechanism and allows us to analyse 
whether the SSM affects excess correlations between bank and sovereign risk. This variable takes the value 
of 1 from Q4-2014 to Q4-2016, and 0 otherwise. The effect that the SSM has on excess correlations is 
measured by the coefficient β1, which is expected to be negative and significant. As we mentioned 
previously, one of the main purposes of the SSM is to introduce more homogeneous financial conditions 
for all banks, to improve the health of the banking system and make banks less likely to fail, thereby 
reducing the interdependency between sovereign and bank risk. 
ΔCDSBank represents bank CDS spread variations in quarter t in relation to quarter t-1. The use of 
this variable allows us to analyse how an increase in bank risk affects contagion between bank and sovereign 
risk. Since we are also interested in analysing how these effects differ before and after the adoption of the 
SSM, we also include in Equation (4) the interaction term between the SSM dummy and the bank risk 
variable (SSM*ΔCDSBank). The coefficient β2 measures the effects of bank risk (ΔCDSBank) on contagion 
before the SSM. We expect this coefficient to have a positive and significant sign because before the SSM, 
an increase in bank risk would lead to greater contagion (Gray et al. 2008; Ejsing and Lemke 2011; Alter 
and Schüler 2012). On the other hand, the coefficient β3 captures the differential effects of bank risk on 
                                                          
14 All state variables come from Datastream and are transformed into arithmetic returns, except for the variable Term, 
which is included in first differences (De Bruyckere et al. 2013). 
15 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we clustered the standard errors of the regressions by year and 
country. 
16 We calculate excess correlations on a quarterly basis using daily CDS data, because quarterly frequency is the highest 
frequency for which there is bank balance sheet data available in Datastream (De Bruyckere et al. 2013). 
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contagion after the SSM in relation to the period before it. The effects that bank risk has on contagion 
should have been reduced after the SSM (Leblond 2014; Nowotny 2014), so we expect the coefficient β3 to 
be significant with a negative sign. If this was the case, to test the final effects of bank risk on contagion 
after the SSM, we should conduct a linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients of ΔCDSBank and 
SSM*ΔCDSBank (β2+ β3). 
Apart from bank risk, we also included in Equation (4) a sovereign risk variable, denoted by 
ΔCDSSov, and its interaction with the SSM (SSM*ΔCDSSov).17 On the one hand, the coefficient β4 captures 
the effects of sovereign risk on contagion before the SSM. We expect this coefficient to be positive and 
significant because before the SSM an increase in sovereign risk will produce greater contagion (Arezki et 
al. 2011; Correa et al. 2012; Gennaioli et al. 2014). On the other hand, the coefficient β5 represents the 
differential effects of sovereign risk on contagion after the SSM in relation to the period before it. Similarly 
to bank risk, we expect the relationship between sovereign risk and contagion to be significantly more 
negative after the SSM than before, so we expect the coefficient β5 to be negative and significant. To test 
the final effects of sovereign risk on contagion after the SSM, we perform a linear restriction test of the 
sum of the coefficients of ΔCDSSov and SSM*ΔCDSSov (β4+ β5). 
The inclusion of both bank and sovereign risk variables (ΔCDSBank and ΔCDSSov) and their 
interactions with the SSM (SSM*ΔCDSBank and SSM*ΔCDSSov) in the same equation18 serves to identify 
more precisely whether contagion between bank and sovereign risk is transmitted from banks to sovereigns 
or vice versa, and how the direction of this transmission is conditioned by the introduction of the SSM. 
SIZE is the ratio of each bank’s total assets to its home country gross domestic product (GDP) and 
serves to control for the size of a bank (De Bruyckere et al. 2013). In periods of financial instability, larger 
banks are more likely to be a source of financial risk to governments, since these banks will require a bailout 
in the case of default (Gerlach et al. 2010). This would increase the default risk co-movement with their 
home country. Therefore, we could expect a significant and positive relationship between the bank size and 
the excess correlations.  
CAP is the risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio. Better-capitalized banks are less likely to need 
government support, since these banks are better able to absorb losses arising from bad assets (Baele et al. 
2007; Gerlach et al. 2010; Altunbas et al. 2011). Consequently, higher levels of capital should reduce excess 
correlation between bank and sovereign risk. 
RETAIL denotes the loan-to-assets ratio and is an indicator of banks’ retail orientation. Retail banks 
are perceived as less risky than the non-retail ones, especially during a crisis. Additionally, banks with 
higher levels of loans have a lower proportion of securities, which reduces their exposure to sovereign 
bonds (De Bruyckere et al. 2013). Therefore, there should be a negative and significant relationship between 
the variable RETAIL and excess correlation. 
FUNDSTRUC is the level of short-term market debt over total liabilities and equity and represents 
a proxy for each bank’s funding structure. Banks that rely more on wholesale funding instead of deposits 
are considered more risky, especially during a crisis, when market-based funding is very volatile (Altunbas 
et al. 2011). This greater bank risk can be transmitted to the sovereign, so we expect a positive relationship 
between the funding structure of a bank and the excess correlation. 
MES denotes marginal expected shortfall and is a proxy of the exposure of each bank to systemic 
risk. It is calculated as the average return of each bank during the 5% worst days for the European market 
in quarter t, so it represents the expected equity loss when the market itself is in its left tail (Idier et al. 2014; 
Acharya et al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2017). Higher exposure to systemic risk would lead to greater contagion, 
so we expect this variable to have a positive and significant coefficient.  
ΔGDP is the GDP growth of country j in quarter t in relation to quarter t-1 and accounts for both 
business cycle conditions and bank growth opportunities (De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga 2013). On the one hand, economic recessions may amplify banking crises and worsen the 
financial situation of the public sector, which will increase both bank and sovereign CDS spreads. If both 
banks and sovereigns increase their CDS, their correlations will be greater. Consequently, a negative 
relationship can be expected between GDP growth and excess correlations. However, higher growth 
opportunities and better economic conditions are expected to increase bank valuation and to improve the 
soundness of public finances, which will reduce both bank and sovereign CDS spreads. If both banks and 
                                                          
17 Quarterly bank and sovereign CDS are calculated as the average of the daily CDS of each quarter. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2013) followed a similar approach to compute annual CDS from daily data. 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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sovereigns reduced their CDS, the correlation between them would also be higher. Hence, a positive and 
significant coefficient for GDP growth is also expected. 
PUBDEBT represents the ratio of public debt to GDP for country j. Greater levels of this ratio 
produce an increase in sovereign risk, which can be transmitted to the banking sector (Gerlach et al. 2010; 
Kallestrup et al. 2016). Thus, we expect a positive and significant relationship between PUBDEBT and 
excess correlations. 
FISCBAL is the fiscal balance and is calculated as government revenues minus expenses divided by 
GDP (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2013). Higher fiscal balances imply stronger public finances, which 
will reduce the interdependency between banks and sovereigns. Therefore, we expect a negative 
relationship between FISCBAL and excess correlation. 
According to De Bruyckere et al. (2013), all the control variables are standardized, which implies 
that the coefficients show the impact of a one standard deviation change of these control variables on the 
excess correlation between bank and sovereign CDS spreads.19 
The error term is 𝜀𝑖,𝑡; i = 1,2,…; N indicates a specific bank i; j = 1,2,…; J indicates a particular 
country j; and t = 1,2,…; T indicates a particular quarter t.20 
Table 8 provides a summary of the independent variables and their expected relationship with the 
dependent variable. Table 9 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Table 10 
presents the correlations between variables to identify potential collinearity problems. 
[Insert Tables 8, 9 & 10] 
Similarly to the stock return analysis, the empirical estimation of Equation (4) was performed using 
panel regression models. The Hausman specification test was also conducted to decide between fixed-
effects and random-effects estimators in each model (Hausman 1978). 
3.2.3. Empirical results 
Table 11, model (a), shows the results. The results of the Hausman test show that the fixed-effects 
estimator is more consistent (p-value < 0.05). 
 [Insert Table 11] 
In Table 11, model (a), the variable SSM is significant with a negative coefficient. Thus, the adoption 
of the SSM leads to a reduction in contagion between bank and sovereign CDS spreads.  
The variable ΔCDSBank, which measures the effects of bank CDS growth on contagion before the 
SSM, is positive with a significant coefficient. This implies that before the SSM, an increase in bank CDS 
spreads leads to greater contagion between bank and sovereign CDS spreads. However, SSM*ΔCDSBank is 
not significant, so the differential effects of bank risk on contagion after the adoption of the SSM are not 
statistically significantly different from those before. Consequently, there is no evidence that the adoption 
of the SSM reduces contagion from bank to sovereign CDS spreads. 
The variable ΔCDSSov, which measures the effects of sovereign risk on contagion before the SSM, 
is not significant. In addition, the variable SSM*ΔCDSSov is not significant either, so the differential effects 
of sovereign risk would not vary significantly before or after the adoption of the SSM. This would suggest 
that an increase in sovereign risk does not affect contagion through CDS spreads, either before or after the 
implementation of the SSM.  
Similarly to the stock returns analysis, we performed additional estimations and replaced the SSM 
dummy in Equation (4) with other dummies that capture other regulatory changes that came into play during 
our sample period (SSMANN, DRAGHI and SRM). These additional estimations allow us to ensure that our 
results are explicitly due to the entry into force of the SSM and not to other events.  
                                                          
19 Control variables are standardized by calculating the deviation from the average and dividing this by the standard 
deviation of the variable. Bank-specific variables are standardized at the bank level, while macroeconomic variables 
are standardized at the country level. 
20 We do not include country dummies in our model, since some countries of the sample contain only one bank, and 
hence the country dummies in this case could be biased by the situation of the specific bank instead of representing the 
global situation of the country. Instead, we use macroeconomic variables to control for the situation of the country, 
such as the GDP growth (ΔGDP), the public debt ratio (PUBDEBT) and the fiscal balance (FISCBAL). 
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In Table 11, model (b), the variable SSMANN is negative and significant, so the announcement of 
the SSM also reduces contagion between bank and sovereign CDS spreads, which suggests that the effects 
of the SSM are already noticeable from the very beginning of its announcement. 
  The variable ΔCDSBank, which captures the effects of bank risk before the announcement of the 
SSM, is positive with a significant coefficient. So, before the announcement of the SSM, an increase in 
bank risk produces greater contagion. However, SSMANN*ΔCDSBank, which controls for the differential 
effects of bank risk after the announcement of the SSM in relation to before, is not significant. Similarly to 
model (a), the effects of bank risk on contagion after the announcement of the SSM do not significantly 
vary with respect to the period before it.  
The variable ΔCDSSov, which measures the effects of sovereign risk on contagion before the 
announcement of the SSM, is not significant. However, SSMANN*ΔCDSSov is negative and significant, 
which means that the impact of sovereign risk on contagion is significantly more negative after the 
announcement of the SSM than before. Therefore, we must perform the linear restriction test of the sum of 
the coefficients of ΔCDSSov and SSMANN*ΔCDSSov (denoted by LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov in Table 11, 
model (b)). LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov, which measures the effect of sovereign risk on contagion after the 
announcement of the SSM, is negative and significant. Consequently, after the announcement of the SSM, 
an increase in sovereign risk reduces excess correlations. Probably, after the announcement of the SSM, 
bank CDS spreads do not react to an increase in sovereign CDS spreads, thereby reducing contagion 
between both types of CDS. 
The results from model (b) would suggest that the announcement of the SSM in March 2013 reduces 
contagion between bank and sovereign risk, and the direction of this reduction is only explained by the 
lower impact of sovereign risk on bank risk, and not vice versa.  
In Table 11, model (c), we replaced the SSM dummy with the DRAGHI dummy, which captures 
Draghi’s speech in July 2012 authorizing OMT transactions. The variable DRAGHI shows a negative and 
significant coefficient, so Draghi’s speech reduces excess correlations. 
The variable ΔCDSBank is positive with a significant coefficient, so before Draghi’s speech, an 
increase in bank risk leads to greater contagion between bank and sovereign risk. However, 
DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank is not significant, so there are no significant differences in the relationship between 
bank risk and contagion after or before the speech. 
The variable ΔCDSSov is not significant, so before the speech, an increase in sovereign risk does not 
alter the level of contagion between bank and sovereign risk. Moreover, DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov is not 
significant either, and therefore the effects of sovereign risk on contagion do not vary significantly after the 
speech with respect to the period before. This shows that the observed reduction in contagion from 
sovereign to bank risk observed in model (b) is explicitly due to the announcement of the SSM and not to 
the previous speech of Draghi.  
In Table 11, model (d), we replaced the SSM dummy with the SRM dummy, which represents the 
implementation of the second pillar of the European Banking Union, the Single Resolution Mechanism, in 
January 2016. The variable SRM is not significant, thus the entry into force of the SRM itself does not affect 
contagion between bank and sovereign risk. 
The variable ΔCDSBank is positive with a significant coefficient, whereas SRM*ΔCDSBank is not 
significant. This implies that before the SRM, there is a positive relationship between bank risk and 
contagion, and this relationship does not significantly change after the SRM in relation to before. In terms 
of sovereign risk, the variables ΔCDSSov and SRM*ΔCDSSov are not significant. Thus, an increase in 
sovereign risk does not affect contagion through CDS spreads, either before or after the SRM21. 
3.2.4. Robustness checks 
Similarly to the stock returns analysis, to check the robustness of our results, we have repeated the 
previous estimations and replaced each individual regulatory dummy (SSM, SSMANN, DRAGHI and SRM) 
with year dummies to control for year fixed effects22 (see Table 12). The results stated in Table 12 under 
models (a), (b), (c), and (d) show that the p-value of the Hausman test is greater than 0.05, so the random-
effects estimator is more consistent. 
                                                          
21 Following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have repeated the previous analyses by excluding all 
insignificant explanatory variables and the results are similar. These results are not reported, but are available on 
request. 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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[Insert Table 12] 
The results from Table 12 show that only the announcement of the SSM (SSMANN in model (b)) 
has a significant effect on contagion, since in the rest of the models, (a), (c) and (d), our variables of interest 
are not significant. In this regards, in model (a), the variables ΔCDSBank, SSM*ΔCDSBank, ΔCDSSov and 
SSM*ΔCDSSov are not significant, so either bank or sovereign risk do not significantly affect contagion 
either before or after the adoption of the SSM. In model (c), the variables ΔCDSBank, DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank, 
ΔCDSSov and DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov are not significant and, hence, there are no significant interdependencies 
between bank and sovereign risk either before or after Draghi’s speech. Besides, in model (d), the variables 
ΔCDSBank, SRM*ΔCDSBank, ΔCDSSov and SRM*ΔCDSSov are not significant, which means that there is no 
significant contagion from bank to sovereign risk, or vice versa, either before or after the SRM. 
With regard to model (b), the variable ΔCDSBank, which measures the effects of bank risk on 
contagion before the announcement of the SSM, is not significant. In addition, SSMANN*ΔCDSBank is not 
significant either, so the effects of bank risk on contagion after the announcement of the SSM are not 
significantly different from those before. The results from this model would not show evidence of contagion 
from bank to sovereign risk either before or after the announcement of the SSM. 
The variable ΔCDSSov, which captures the influence of sovereign risk on contagion before the 
announcement of the SSM, is not significant. However, SSMANN*ΔCDSSov is significant with a negative 
sign, so the effects of sovereign risk on contagion are significantly more negative after the announcement 
of the SSM than before. If we consider the linear restriction test LR Test., SSMANN*ΔCDSSov, which 
measures the impact of an increase in sovereign risk after the announcement of the SSM, is significant with 
a negative sign. So, as indicated previously, the announcement of the SSM has significantly reduced 
contagion from sovereign to bank risk. 
Looking jointly at the results of Tables 11 and 12, they would support the idea that only the 
announcement of the SSM in March 2013 has reduced contagion between bank and sovereign risk through 
CDS. In addition, this contagion reduction is only explained by the lower impact of sovereign risk on bank 
risk after this announcement, and not vice versa. Before the announcement of the SSM, an increase in 
sovereign CDS spreads does not modify the degree of contagion between bank and sovereign risk. 
However, after the announcement of the SSM, an increase in sovereign CDS spreads leads to lower 
contagion, probably because bank risk does not react to an increase in sovereign risk, thereby reducing 
contagion between both types of risk. However, we have no evidence that other regulatory measures reduce 
contagion through CDS. Moreover, contrary to banks’ stock returns where there is not enough evidence, 
CDS spreads’ response occurs immediately after the announcement of the SSM. 
As additional robustness checks, we have repeated the analyses by controlling for bank holdings of 
sovereign debt.23 Therefore, we included in Equation (4) the variable SOVHOLD, which represents resident 
banks’ exposure to sovereign bond holdings in a specific country in quarter t. These data come from the 
Bruegel database of sovereign bond holdings developed in Merler and Pisani-Ferri (2012).24 The results of 
the robustness checks are similar to those reported previously.25  
3.3. Discussion 
This article analyses how the adoption of the SSM affects contagion between bank and sovereign 
risk. On the one hand, using stock price data, we show that the implementation of the European Banking 
Union negatively affects banks’ stock returns, since the adoption of both the SSM and the SRM, the first 
two pillars, impacts negatively on banks’ performance in the stock market. However, we do not find solid 
evidence that the SSM and the SRM reduce contagion from sovereign risk to stock returns. On the other 
hand, using CDS spreads, we find that only the announcement of the SSM in March 2013 reduces contagion 
between bank and sovereign risk. Moreover, the reduction in this contagion is determined by the lower 
influence of sovereign risk on bank risk after the announcement, and not vice versa. Before the 
announcement of the SSM, an increase in sovereign risk does not alter contagion, but after, an increase in 
sovereign risk produces lower contagion, probably because bank risk does not react, which reduces 
interdependencies between the two types of risk.  
                                                          
23 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
24 This database does not contain quarterly information about resident banks’ sovereign debt holdings either for Austria 
and Belgium throughout the whole sample period or for Germany from Q3-2015. So, the robustness checks comprise 
22 banks and eight countries (671 observations). 
25 These results are not shown in the article but are available on request. 
 15 
 
These results reveal a different reaction between CDS spreads and stock prices, since the former 
reacts immediately to the announcement of the SSM, whereas there is not consistent evidence for stock 
prices. These results are in line with other studies that show that stock prices underreact to positive news, 
especially in bad times because investors tend to bear more uncertainties during recessions (McQueen et 
al. 1996; Veronesi 1999). Moreover, our results are consistent with the evidence obtained by Giannikos et 
al. (2013), who find that during the recent financial crisis the financial sector’s CDS market is more 
responsive to new information. These authors support this more dominant role in price discovery of the 
CDS market with behavioral finance models, which suggest that, before the crisis, a more stable equity 
market led investors to feel overconfident, which increased speculative noise trading (Odean 1998; Gervais 
and Odean 2001; Statman et al. 2006). Informed traders would prefer to speculate on the CDS market 
because the derivative markets provide more leverage and make it easier for traders to hide informed trades 
(Black 1975; Easley et al. 1998). However, during the crisis, the market is very volatile and hence much 
less conducive to noise trading. The reduction of noise trading in the CDS market improves the quality of 
the CDS prices, and strengthens the role of the CDS market in price discovery. 
4. Conclusions 
The financial crisis that started in 2008 raised investor concerns about sovereign risk in several 
European countries, which negatively affected the financial situation of the domestic banking sector and 
increased bank risk. Additionally, weak capital positions and liquidity problems in the banking system 
during the crisis were transmitted to the soundness of public finances, thereby increasing sovereign risk. 
These facts generated a vicious circle between bank and sovereign risk, which seriously damaged the 
stability of the global financial system. 
To break this contagion between bank and sovereign risk, the European Banking Union was 
proposed in 2012, consisting of three pillars: the Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM), the Single 
Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and the common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS). The SSM was the first 
pillar to enter into force on 4 November 2014, when the ECB became the major supervisor of European 
banks in collaboration with the NSA of each country. 
This article analyses how the adoption of the SSM affects contagion between bank and sovereign 
risk. Additionally, we test whether the effects of a variation in bank and sovereign risk on this contagion 
differ before and after the SSM. The SSM is supposed to reduce contagion between banks and sovereigns, 
since it implies applying common rules to all banks, which will lead to more homogeneous funding 
conditions and will make banks less dependent on their home country’s sovereign risk. This will reduce the 
uncertainty premiums that some banks pay. Moreover, the SSM will improve the health of the banking 
system and will enable the direct intervention of the ESM to provide temporary financial assistance to 
troubled banks, so governments do not need to rescue systemic banks and the risk of spillovers from banks 
to sovereigns will be reduced. 
We perform an empirical analysis based on two indicators: banks’ stock returns and CDS spreads. 
The analysis of stock returns comprises quarterly data from 80 banks and 13 eurozone countries between 
2009 and 2016 (2,441 observations). We do not have solid evidence that the SSM reduces contagion from 
sovereign risk to banks’ stock returns. The analysis of CDS spreads is based on quarterly data from 25 
banks and 10 eurozone countries over the period 2009–2016 (771 observations). We find that only the 
announcement of the SSM in March 2013 reduces contagion between bank and sovereign risk. In addition, 
before the announcement of the SSM, an increase in sovereign risk does not alter the degree of contagion, 
while after this announcement, an increase in sovereign risk leads to lower contagion. Consequently, CDS 
spreads react immediately to the announcement of the SSM, but there is not consistent evidence for banks’ 
stock returns, probably because during the recent crisis, the financial sector’s CDS market played a more 
dominant role in price discovery, whereas stock prices normally underreact to good news in recession 
periods.  
This article has tried to shed light on the effects of the SSM on contagion between banks and 
sovereigns during its first quarters of operation. However, the SSM also poses several issues, especially in 
the long run. For instance, there can be potential conflicting objectives between the ECB and the NSA of 
each country, difficulties dealing with European countries that do not participate in the SSM, or possible 
conflicting relationships between micro- and macro-prudential supervision. In addition, there are still 
uncertainties about the ECB’s ability to stabilize the banking system, since its main role is to ensure price 
stability. Thus, further research is needed to fully understand the effectiveness of the SSM in the long run. 
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Fig. 1: Stock market’s banks index in Eurozone countries.  
This figure shows the evolution of the stock market’s banks index 
on a daily country-by-country basis between 1st January 2009 and 
31st December 2016.  The index for Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
are shown at the right y-axis, whereas the index for all other 
countries is shown at the left y-axis. 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
 
Fig. 2: Bank CDS spreads.  
This figure shows the evolution of the average CDS spread for 
banks on a daily country-by-country basis between 1st January 
2009 and 31st December 2016. The CDS spread for Greece is 
shown at the right y-axis, whereas the spread for all other countries 
is shown at the left y-axis. 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
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Fig. 3: Sovereign CDS spreads.  
This figure shows the evolution of the CDS spread for sovereigns 
on a daily country-by-country basis between 1st January 2009 and 
31st December 2016. The CDS spread for Greece is shown at the 
right y-axis, whereas the spread for all other countries is shown at 
the left y-axis. 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
 
 
Fig. 4: Bank – Sovereign CDS correlations. 
This figure shows the average yearly correlations between the 
sovereign CDS spread and the banks headquartered in that country 
between 2009 and 2016. 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
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Table 1: Stock returns analysis – List of countries and banks 
Austria Autobank, Bank für Tirol und Vorarlberg, BKS Bank, Erste Group Bank, Oberbank, 
Raiffeisen Bank, and Volksbank.  
Belgium Banque Nationale de Belgique, Dexia, and KBC Bank. 
Finland Aktia, and Alandsbanken. 
France BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, CRCAM Alpes Provence, CRCAM Atlantique 
Vendée, CRCAM Brie Picardie, CRCAM d´Ille-de-France, CRCAM d´Ille-et-
Vilaine, CRCAM Languedoc, CRCAM Loire Haute Loire, CRCAM Morbihan, 
CRCAM Nord De France, CRCAM Normandie Seine, CRCAM Sud Rhône Alpes, 
CRCAM Toulouse 31, CRCAM Touraine, Natixis, and Société Generale. 
Germany Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Merkur Bank, Oldenburgische Landesbank, Quirin 
Bank, Südwestbank, UmweltBank, and WestLB. 
Greece Alpha Bank, Attica Bank, Eurobank Ergasias, National Bank of Greece, Piraeus 
Bank, T Bank, and TT Hellenic Postbank. 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks, Bank of Ireland, and Permanent tsb. 
Italy Banca Carige, Banca Finnat Euramerica, Banca Monte dei Paschi, Banca Piccolo 
Credito Valtellinese, Banca Popolare dell´Emilia Romagna, Banca Popolare di 
Milano, Banca Popolare di Sondrio, Banca Profilo, Banco BPM, Banco di Sardegna, 
Banco Desio, Credito Emiliano, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca, Unicredit, and Unione 
di Banche Italiene. 
Lithuania Siauliu Bankas. 
Netherlands ING Groep, and Van Lanschot Kempen. 
Portugal Banco Comercial Português, Banco Espirito Santo, and Banco Português de 
Investimento. 
Slovakia OTP Banka, Tatra Banka, and Úverová Banka. 
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Banco Popular Español, Banco Sabadell, Banco 
Santander, Bankia, Bankinter, Caixabank, and Liberbank. 
This table shows the list of the 80 banks and 13 countries included in our stock returns analysis. For each bank we report its home 
country. 
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Fig. 6: Quarterly average of the correlations between bank 
and sovereign residuals.  
This figure shows the evolution of the quarterly averages of the 
correlations between the residuals of a bank and those from its 
respective home country between January 2009 and December 
2016 (Equation (3)). 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
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Fig. 5: Quarterly average of bank and sovereign residuals.  
This figure shows the evolution of the quarterly averages of the 
banks and sovereigns CDS spreads residuals between January 
2009 and December 2016 (Equation (3)). 
Source: own elaboration based on data from Datastream 
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Table 2: Stock returns analysis – Summary of the independent variables 
 
Variable 
 
Proxy 
Expected relationship with 
banks’ stock returns 
 
SSM 
Entry into force of the SSM. Dummy variable (1: from 
Q4-2014 to Q4-2016; 0 otherwise) 
 
NEGATIVE 
SR (CDSSovt-CDSSovt-1)/ CDSSovt-1 NEGATIVE 
SSM*SR Interaction term between the SSM and SR POSITIVE 
 
RM,t 
Difference between the average of the total daily 
European returns and the 10-year German government 
interest rate in quarter t 
 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
RSMB,t 
Spread between the returns on small and big European 
stocks 
 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
 
RHML,t 
Spread between the returns of high book-to-market 
European stocks (value stocks) and low ones (growth 
stocks) 
 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
 
RMOM,t 
Spread between the returns of past winners (European 
stocks with the highest prior returns) and past losers 
(European stocks with the lowest prior returns) 
 
POSITIVE/NEGATIVE 
This table shows the independent variables used in Equation (1) and their expected relationship with the dependent variable (Ri,t: 
bank’s stock returns). SSM represents the Single Supervision Mechanism; SR the sovereign risk; SSM*SR the interaction term 
between the Single Supervision Mechanism and sovereign risk; RM,t the market risk; RSMB,t the small size risk; RHML,t the distress risk; 
and RMOM,t the momentum effect. 
 
 
Table 3: Stock returns analysis – Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
Ri,t -4.8988 21.8032 -108.1075 225.1063 
SR 3.3835 30.0970 -53.2569 143.2854 
RM,t -0.1329 6.0315 -20.054 14.5834 
RSMB,t 0.0017 0.3919 -1.0100 0.4850 
RHML,t 0.0418 0.2007 -0.3700 0.5050 
RMOM,t 0.0649 0.3159 -0.7550 0.6200 
This table shows the summary statistics for the continuous variables used in Equation (1). Ri,t represents the bank’s stock returns; SR 
the sovereign risk; RM,t the market risk; RSMB,t the small size risk; RHML,t the distress risk; and RMOM,t the momentum effect. 
 
Table 4: Stock returns analysis – Correlations 
 
SR RM,t RSMB,t RHML,t RMOM,t 
SR 1     
RM,t -0.5585 1    
RSMB,t 0.0934 0.2000 1   
RHML,t -0.2018 0.2061 -0.0299 1  
RMOM,t 0.0968 0.0558 0.3307 -0.2536 1 
This table shows the correlations between the continuous independent variables used in Equation (1). SR represents the sovereign 
risk; RM,t the market risk; RSMB,t the small size risk; RHML,t the distress risk; and RMOM,t the momentum effect. 
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Table 5: Stock returns analysis – Results  
 
(a) 
SSM 
(b) 
SSMANN 
(c) 
DRAGHI 
(d) 
SRM 
SSM -1.7234 (-1.92)  *          
SSMANN    0.4877 (0.54)        
DRAGHI       1.8398 (1.81) *    
SRM          -4.0811 (-3.30) *** 
SR -0.1520 (-8.91) ***   -0.1278 (-7.04) *** -0.1134 (-5.63) *** -0.1420 (-8.56) *** 
SSM*SR 0.1833 (3.11) ***          
SSMANN*SR    -0.0480 (-1.08)        
DRAGHI*SR       -0.0342 (-0.90)     
SRM*SR          0.2205 (2.71) *** 
RM,t 0.6319 (7.61) *** 0.6835 (8.15) *** 0.7040 (8.33) *** 0.6708 (8.13) *** 
RSMB,t 4.9415 (4.41) *** 4.0001 (3.62) *** 3.7415 (3.37) *** 4.5645 (4.16) *** 
RHML,t 13.7740 (6.67) *** 12.8621 (6.15) *** 13.4928 (6.56) *** 13.6288 (6.63) *** 
RMOM,t -1.0990 (-0.80)  -1.2208 (-0.83)  -2.1271 (-1.41)  -0.7164 (-0.52)  
CONS -4.3639 (-8.88) *** -5.1537 (-8.84) *** -6.0408 (-8.41) *** -4.4715 (-10.23) *** 
LR Test. SSM*SR 0.0314 (0.54)           
LR Test. SSMANN*SR    -0.1758 (-4.10) ***       
LR Test. DRAGHI*SR       -0.1476 (-4.04) ***    
LR Test. SRM*SR          0.0786 (0.96)  
R-squared (overall) 0.172   0.167   0.166   0.173   
Hausman test 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
OLS model Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
The dependent variable is bank’s stock returns (Ri,t); LR Test. SSM*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients 
associated with SSM and SR under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*SR is the linear restriction test 
of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSMANN and SR under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. 
DRAGHI*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with DRAGHI and SR under the following null 
hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SRM*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and SR 
under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. CONS is the regression intercept. R-squared (overall) is the proportion of the 
variation in bank’s stock returns explained by the model. Hausman test is a test of correlation between the unique errors (ui) and the 
explanatory variables (Xi,t), and serves to determine whether fixed or random effects are suitable. OLS model denotes whether we use 
fixed or random effects depending on the result of the Hausman test. 
First, the results show the coefficients associated with each variable; Second, they show in brackets T-student; Third they depict the 
level of significance of each variable:  *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01; ** indicates a level of significance of 0.05; and * 
indicates a level of significance of 0.1.  
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Table 6: Stock returns analysis – Results (Robustness check)  
 
(a) 
SSM 
(b) 
SSMANN 
(c) 
DRAGHI 
(d) 
SRM 
SR -0.0791 (-3.13) ***   -0.0532 (-2.01) ** -0.0693 (-2.58) ** -0.0777 (-3.17) *** 
SSM * SR -0.0129 (-0.18)           
SSMANN * SR    -0.1257 (-2.25) **       
DRAGHI * SR       -0.0461 (-0.89)     
SRM * SR          -0.0449 (-0.46)  
RM,t 0.6768 (5.21) *** 0.1044 (0.57)  0.0436 (0.24)  0.6814 (5.32) *** 
RSMB,t 1.1906 (0.50)  24.9121 (10.70) *** 24.7121 (10.62) *** 1.1625 (0.49)  
RHML,t 50.9588 (7.62) *** 27.2619 (7.71) *** 27.2869 (7.71) *** 51.0418 (7.65) *** 
RMOM,t -7.7954 (-3.36) *** -1.6397 (-0.52)  -0.1387 (-0.04)  -7.8435 (-3.40) *** 
CONS -10.3173 (-5.96) *** 4.4010 (3.30) *** 4.8798 (3.66) *** -10.3540 (-6.01) *** 
LR Test. SSM*SR -0.0919 (-1.42)           
LR Test. SSMANN*SR    -0.1789 (-3.62) ***       
LR Test. DRAGHI*SR       -0.1154 (-2.54) **    
LR Test. SRM*SR          -0.1226 (-1.31)  
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared (overall) 0.272   0.271   0.272   0.272   
Hausman test 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   
OLS model Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects Fixed effects 
The dependent variable is bank’s stock returns (Ri,t); LR Test. SSM*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients 
associated with SSM and SR under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*SR is the linear restriction test 
of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSMANN and SR under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. 
DRAGHI*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with DRAGHI and SR under the following null 
hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SRM*SR is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and SR 
under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. Time dummies are included in the estimations, but no reported. CONS is the 
regression intercept. R-squared (overall) is the proportion of the variation in bank’s stock returns explained by the model. Hausman 
test is a test of correlation between the unique errors (ui) and the explanatory variables (Xi,t), and serves to determine whether fixed or 
random effects are suitable. OLS model denotes whether we use fixed or random effects depending on the result of the Hausman test. 
First, the results show the coefficients associated with each variable; Second, they show in brackets T-student; Third they depict the 
level of significance of each variable:  *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01; ** indicates a level of significance of 0.05; and * 
indicates a level of significance of 0.1.  
 
Table 7: CDS spreads analysis – List of countries and banks 
Austria Erste Group Bank, and Raiffeisen Bank.  
Belgium KBC Bank. 
France BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Natixis, and Société Generale. 
Germany Commerzbank, and Deutsche Bank. 
Greece Alpha Bank, Eurobank Ergasias, and National Bank of Greece. 
Ireland Allied Irish Banks. 
Italy Banca Monte dei Paschi, Intesa Sanpaolo, Mediobanca, Unicredit, and Unione di 
Banche Italiene. 
Netherlands ING Groep. 
Portugal Banco Comercial Português. 
Spain Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Banco Popular Español, Banco Sabadell, Banco 
Santander, and Bankinter. 
This table shows the list of the 25 banks and 10 countries included in our CDS spreads analysis. For each bank we report its home 
country. 
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Table 8: CDS spreads analysis – Summary of the independent variables 
 
Variable 
 
Proxy 
Expected relationship with the 
excess correlation (contagion) 
 
SSM 
Entry into force of the SSM. Dummy variable (1: from 
Q4-2014 to Q4-2016; 0 otherwise) 
 
NEGATIVE 
ΔCDSBank (CDSBankt-CDSBankt-1)/ CDSBankt-1 POSITIVE 
ΔCDSSov (CDSSovt-CDSSovt-1)/ CDSSovt-1 POSITIVE 
SSM*ΔCDSBank 
Interaction term between the SSM and bank CDS 
growth  
 
NEGATIVE 
SSM*ΔCDSSov 
Interaction term between the SSM and sovereign CDS 
growth 
 
NEGATIVE 
SIZE Bank’s total assets/ Home country GDP POSITIVE 
CAP Risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio NEGATIVE 
RETAIL Loans/Assets NEGATIVE 
FUNDSTRUC Short-term market debt/ (Liabilities + Equity) POSITIVE 
MES 
Average return of each bank during the 5% worst days 
for the European market in quarter t 
POSITIVE 
ΔGDP (GDPt-GDPt-1)/ GDPt-1 POSITIVE/ NEGATIVE 
PUBDEBT Public debt/GDP POSITIVE 
FISCBAL (Government revenues – expenses)/GDP NEGATIVE 
This table shows the independent variables used in Equation (4) and their expected relationship with the dependent variable 
(EXCCORR: excess correlation between the CDS spreads of a bank and its home country). SSM represents the Single Supervision 
Mechanism; ΔCDSBank the bank CDS spread variation; ΔCDSSov the sovereign CDS spread variation; SSM*ΔCDSBank the interaction 
term between the Single Supervision Mechanism and the bank CDS spread variation; SSM*ΔCDSSov the interaction term between the 
Single Supervision Mechanism and the sovereign CDS spread variation; SIZE the ratio of each bank’s total assets to its home country 
GDP; CAP the risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio; RETAIL the bank’s retail orientation; FUNDSTRUC the bank’s funding structure; 
MES the bank’s marginal expected shortfall; ΔGDP the GDP growth; PUBDEBT the ratio of public debt over GDP; and FISCBAL 
the fiscal balance of a country. 
 
Table 9: Sample statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
EXCCORR 0.2111 0.2087 -0.5977 0.9854 
ΔCDSBank 0.0334 0.2869 -0.8255 2.3413 
ΔCDSSov 0.0334 0.3234 -0.5488 1.6703 
SIZE 2.3193 1.6875 0.1583 9.0819 
CAP 11.6976 2.8093 -6.7000 17.9000 
RETAIL 0.5868 0.1544 0.2044 0.8253 
FUNDSTRUC 0.1821 0.0961 0.0184 0.4646 
MES -0.0304 0.0264 -0.1944 0.1703 
ΔGDP 0.0005 0.0125 -0.0474 0.2158 
PUBDEBT 1.0338 0.3068 0.4278 1.8095 
FISCBAL -0.0540 0.0380 -0.3205 0.0082 
This table shows the summary statistics for the continuous variables used in Equation (4). EXCCORR represents the excess correlation 
between the CDS spreads of the bank and its home country; ΔCDSBank the bank CDS spread variation; ΔCDSSov the sovereign CDS 
spread variation; SIZE the ratio of each bank’s total assets to its home country GDP; CAP the risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio; 
RETAIL the bank’s retail orientation; FUNDSTRUC the bank’s funding structure; MES the bank’s marginal expected shortfall; ΔGDP 
the GDP growth; PUBDEBT the ratio of public debt over GDP; and FISCBAL the fiscal balance of a country. The statistics of the 
variables SIZE, CAP, RETAIL, FUNDSTRUC, MES, ΔGDP, PUBDEBT and FISCBAL are calculated before the standardization to 
show more comprehensive information. 
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Table 10: Correlations 
 ΔCDSBank ΔCDSSov SIZE CAP RETAIL FUNDSTRUC MES ΔGDP PUBDEBT FISCBAL 
ΔCDSBank 1          
ΔCDSSov 0.6340 1         
SIZE -0.0145 0.0016 1        
CAP -0.1299 -0.2505 0.1122 1       
RETAIL 0.0578 0.0953 -0.3427 -0.2144 1      
FUNDSTRUC 0.0826 0.1512 -0.3371 -0.1728 0.2616 1     
MES -0.2406 -0.2439 -0.0272 0.0043 0.0842 0.0838 1    
ΔGDP -0.1473 -0.2365 0.0503 0.2289 -0.1408 -0.1965 0.1159 1   
PUBDEBT -0.0068 0.0354 -0.2239 0.0948 0.2532 0.3139 0.0179 -0.1490 1  
FISCBAL -0.1392 -0.2342 -0.1074 0.2948 -0.3296 -0.4439 
-
0.0988 
0.2012 -0.0477 1 
This table shows the correlations between the continuous independent variables used in Equation (4). ΔCDSBank represents the bank 
CDS spread variation; ΔCDSSov the sovereign CDS spread variation; SIZE the ratio of each bank’s total assets to its home country 
GDP; CAP the risk-weighted Tier 1 capital ratio; RETAIL the bank’s retail orientation; FUNDSTRUC the bank’s funding structure; 
MES the bank’s marginal expected shortfall; ΔGDP the GDP growth; PUBDEBT the ratio of public debt over GDP; and FISCBAL 
the fiscal balance of a country. 
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Table 11: CDS spreads analysis – Results  
 
(a) 
SSM 
(b) 
SSMANN 
(c) 
DRAGHI 
(d) 
SRM 
SSM -0.0730 (-3.27)  ***          
SSMANN    -0.0461 (-2.06) **       
DRAGHI       -0.0459 (-2.24) **    
SRM          -0.0284 (-1.11)  
ΔCDSBank 0.0723 (1.73) *   0.0855 (1.96) * 0.0859 (1.83) * 0.0560 (1.65) * 
ΔCDSSov -0.0438 (-1.26)  -0.0446 (-1.23)  -0.0552 (-1.46)  -0.0428 (-1.38)  
SSM*ΔCDSBank -0.0029 (-0.04)           
SSM*ΔCDSSov -0.0796 (-0.75)           
SSMANN*ΔCDSBank    -0.0796 (-1.24)        
SSMANN*ΔCDSSov    -0.1731 (-2.10) **       
DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank       -0.0706 (-1.10)     
DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov       -0.1144 (-1.58)     
SRM*ΔCDSBank          -0.0171 (-0.14)  
SRM*ΔCDSSov          -0.1297 (-0.70)  
SIZE 0.0134 (0.43)  0.0359 (1.25)  0.0174 (1.27)  0.0477 (1.64)  
CAP 0.0026 (0.27)  0.0040 (0.40)  -0.0005 (-0.06)  0.0019 (0.19)  
RETAIL -0.0093 (-0.31)  -0.0055 (-0.19)  -0.0098 (-0.68)  0.0042 (0.14)  
FUNDSTRUC -0.0110 (-0.77)  -0.0100 (-0.71)  -0.0086 (-0.72)  -0.0117 (-0.82)  
MES 0.0015 (0.20)  0.0025 (0.33)  0.0015 (0.20)  0.0006 (0.08)  
ΔGDP -0.0006 (-0.05)  -0.0020 (-0.19)  -0.0025 (-0.25)  -0.0038 (-0.37)  
PUBDEBT 0.0092 (0.46)  0.0080 (0.36)  0.0067 (0.52)  -0.0068 (-0.35)  
FISCBAL -0.0138 (-0.88)  -0.0169 (-1.08)  -0.0199 (-1.47)  -0.0208 (-1.34)  
CONS 0.2291 (23.93) *** 0.2250 (18.72) *** 0.2270 (12.41) *** 0.2148 (25.66) *** 
LR Test. SSM*ΔCDSBank 0.0694 (1.28)           
LR Test. SSM*ΔCDSSov -0.1234 (-1.22)           
LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSBank    0.0090 (0.20)        
LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov    -0.2177 (-2.90) ***       
LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank       0.0153 (0.35)     
LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov       -0.1696 (-2.70) ***    
LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSBank          0.0388 (0.34)  
LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSSov          -0.1725 (-0.95)  
R2 (overall) 0.044   0.043   0.045   0.027   
Hausman test 0.003   0.010   0.090   0.019   
OLS model Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Fixed effects 
The dependent variable is excess correlation between the CDS spreads of the bank and its home country (EXCCORR); LR Test. SSM*ΔCDSBank is the 
linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSM and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. 
SSM*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSM and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 
+ β5 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSMANN and ΔCDSBank under the 
following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with 
SSMANN and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the 
coefficients associated with DRAGHI and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov is the linear 
restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with DRAGHI and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. LR Test. 
SRM*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: 
β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and ΔCDSSov under the following 
null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. CONS is the regression intercept. R-squared (overall) is the proportion of the variation in excess correlation explained 
by the model. Hausman test is a test of correlation between the unique errors (ui) and the explanatory variables (Xi,t), and serves to determine whether 
fixed or random effects are suitable. OLS model denotes whether we use fixed or random effects depending on the result of the Hausman test. 
First, the results show the coefficients associated with each variable; Second, they show in brackets T-student; Third they depict the level of significance 
of each variable: *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01; ** indicates a level of significance of 0.05; and * indicates a level of significance of 0.1.  
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Table 12: CDS spreads analysis – Results (Robustness check) 
 
(a) 
SSM 
(b) 
SSMANN 
(c) 
DRAGHI 
(d) 
SRM 
ΔCDSBank 0.0679 (1.33)    0.0666 (1.22)  0.0424 (0.75)  0.0558 (1.40)  
ΔCDSSov -0.0176 (-0.40)  0.0049 (0.11)  -0.0044 (-0.09)  -0.0216 (-0.53)  
SSM*ΔCDSBank -0.0587 (-0.77)           
SSM*ΔCDSSov -0.1524 (-1.20)           
SSMANN*ΔCDSBank    -0.0480 (-0.63)        
SSMANN*ΔCDSSov    -0.1839 (-1.93) *       
DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank       -0.0037 (-0.05)     
DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov       -0.0881 (-1.01)     
SRM*ΔCDSBank          -0.1248 (-0.92)  
SRM*ΔCDSSov          -0.1280 (-0.64)  
SIZE 0.0129 (0.93)  0.0132 (0.97)  0.0134 (0.91)  0.0120 (0.88)  
CAP 0.0019 (0.21)  0.0029 (0.32)  0.0016 (0.18)  -0.0001 (-0.01)  
RETAIL -0.0105 (-0.74)  -0.0109 (-0.77)  -0.0103 (-0.67)  -0.0104 (-0.74)  
FUNDSTRUC -0.0118 (-1.02)  -0.0118 (-1.03)  -0.0121 (-1.02)  -0.0127 (-1.11)  
MES 0.0009 (0.10)  0.0012 (0.14)  0.0013 (0.14)  0.0011 (0.13)  
ΔGDP -0.0024 (-0.22)  -0.0020 (-0.18)  -0.0020 (-0.18)  -0.0018 (-0.16)  
PUBDEBT 0.0107 (0.80)  0.0099 (0.75)  0.0110 (0.78)  0.0083 (0.63)  
FISCBAL -0.0065 (-0.45)  -0.0071 (-0.50)  -0.0071 (-0.49)  -0.0087 (-0.62)  
CONS 0.1681 (4.08) *** 0.1683 (4.10) *** 0.1661 (3.99) *** 0.1712 (4.15) *** 
LR Test. SSM*ΔCDSBank 0.0092 (0.16)           
LR Test. SSM* ΔCDSSov -0.1700 (-1.43)           
LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSBank    0.0185 (0.35)        
LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov    -0.1790 (-2.12) **       
LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank             
LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov             
LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSBank       0.0387 (0.76)  -0.0690 (-0.53)  
LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSSov       -0.0925 (-1.21)  -0.1496 (-0.77)  
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 (overall) 0.146   0.151   0.146   0.146   
Hausman test 0.085   0.103   0.378   0.143   
OLS model Random effects Random effects Random effects Random effects 
The dependent variable is excess correlation between the CDS spreads of the bank and its home country (EXCCORR); LR Test. SSM*ΔCDSBank is the 
linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSM and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. 
SSM*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSM and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 
+ β5 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SSMANN and ΔCDSBank under the 
following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SSMANN*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with 
SSMANN and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the 
coefficients associated with DRAGHI and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. DRAGHI*ΔCDSSov is the linear 
restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with DRAGHI and ΔCDSSov under the following null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. LR Test. 
SRM*ΔCDSBank is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and ΔCDSBank under the following null hypothesis: H0: 
β2 + β3 = 0. LR Test. SRM*ΔCDSSov is the linear restriction test of the sum of the coefficients associated with SRM and ΔCDSSov under the following 
null hypothesis: H0: β4 + β5 = 0. Time dummies are included in the estimations, but no reported. CONS is the regression intercept. R-squared (overall) is 
the proportion of the variation in excess correlation explained by the model. Hausman test is a test of correlation between the unique errors (ui) and the 
explanatory variables (Xi,t), and serves to determine whether fixed or random effects are suitable. OLS model denotes whether we use fixed or random 
effects depending on the result of the Hausman test. 
First, the results show the coefficients associated with each variable; Second, they show in brackets T-student; Third they depict the level of significance 
of each variable:  *** indicates a level of significance of 0.01; ** indicates a level of significance of 0.05; and * indicates a level of significance of 0.1.  
 
 
 
